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APPENDIX K
Trireme Warfare in Xenophon's Hellenika

§l. The disaster at Syracuse• (415-413) marked the effective end of Athenian naval
supremacy. She would rebuild her fleets and continue to be a force, but Xenophon's
account of the following half century tells of a hard-fought struggle among many
contenders to dominate the Aegean Sea.b Although in the ancient Mediterranean
world geography and tradition favored islands and coastal cities as emergent sea pow
ers, dominance could not be achieved without also having access to the vital resources
of timber, manpower, and plenty of revenue.• Thus the Persian king Artaxerxes and
Jason of Pheraid posed alarming threats to the traditional masters of the Aegean.
Athens, Sparta, and reportedly the Phoenicians managed on occasion to raise fleets of
two or even three hundred warships,• but mostly the seas were dotted with much
smaller flotillas that nevertheless effectively patrolled, threatened, or deterred.
§2. The standard ship of the line in all these navies was the trireme, a seaborne
projectile armed with a bronze ram and powered by three banks of rowers.'
Triremes patrolled coasts, blockaded harbors,b guarded sea-lanes (especially those
from the grain-rich Black Sea),• enforced the collection of tribute and tolls,d and
transported armies,• important people/ and news. But most essentially triremes
were designed for battle on the open seas. Speed and ramming were their primary
offensive weapons. Only a small complement of fighting men-ten marines and four
archers-was traditionally stationed on a trireme. The number and nature of armed
men on board could vary,s but the ram remained the primary weapon. Unlike those
of tubby merchant ships, built for capacity, trireme hulls were long and narrow,h
probably able to slice through the water as fast as any oar-powered ship before or
since, propelled by the coordinated strokes of 170 oarsmen. A crew of sixteen sailors
and officers operated the sails, and they, together with the normal complement of
armed men and the rowers, brought the total number of men on a trireme to 200.
Triremes could also be equipped with sails, so wind had to be taken into account as
K.la
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Syracuse (in Sicily): Ref. Map
Aegean Sea: Ref. Map 2, BX.
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See 5.2.16, 6.1.11,
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1.

7.1.3-7.

Phcrai (in Thessaly): Ref. Map 2, BX.
Large Phoenician fleets: 2.1.20, 2.2.7, 3.4.1.
Phoenicia: Ref. Map I.
S<:e Figure K.2.

S<:e 2.2.9, 4.8.6, 5.1.2, 5.1.7, 6.2.7-8.

K.2c
K.2d

See 1.1.22, 2.J.l7, 4.6.14, 5.4.61.
See 1.1.8, 1.1.12, 1.1.22, 4.8.27, 4.8.31,

K.2c

6.2.38.
See 6.4.18.

K.2f

See 1.1.9, 4.1.15.

K.2g S<:e 1.2.1, 6.2.37.
K.2h

Approximately 120 by 15 feet .
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FIGURE K.l. THE TRIREME 0LYMPIAS UNDER SAIL.
a factor in strategy, but battle tactics were based entirely on rowing maneuvers. In
preparation for battle, every care was taken to gain the advantage of superior speed.
Sails and all items extraneous to the battle at hand (masts, tackle, spares, supplies)
were removed from the ship.i The hulls themselves were dry-docked as often as pos
sible in order to keep them from becoming waterlogged and thus from sitting heav
ily and moving slowly in the water.i Not all triremes were in equal condition or
could attain equal speeds. k Trireme crews took pride in crewing the fastest ship in a
fleet, and captains selected the most experienced men to complete their crews.1 The
tip of this giant water-arrow was a bronze ram that splintered enemy hulls or oars
upon contact. The force of impact was as destructive as the pronged tip of the
K2i

This would explain how the Athenian general

K2j

mos) (Ref. Map 2, AY), was able to capture the

K.21

Konon, in flight from Aigospotamoi (Aigospota·

main sails of the Pcloponnesian fleet (2.1.29),

K.2k

See 1.5.10.

Sec 2.1.24, 5.1.27.
Sec 1.6.19.

which had been left in camp before the battle.

This capture may well have hindered, if nor pre·
vented, the Peloponnesians from pursuing his
ships. See also

6.2.27.
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FIGURE

K.2.

CROSS-SECTIONAL

DIAGRAM OF A TRIREME, SHOW
ING PLACEMENT OF THE THREE
TIERS OF ROWING STATIONS.

weapon; the head of the ram was designed to strike a broad area and split as many
seams of the enemy hull as possible without actually penetrating (and thus getting
stuck in) the foreign wood.
§3. Conventional sea battles began with a face-off: the rw·o opposing navies lined
up against each other.> Each line was extended as far as possible in order to prevent
the enemy from sailing around the ends of the line and attacking the unprotected
sterns from behind (periplous). At the same time, the line could not be over
extended; ships had to be spaced closely enough to prevent the enemy from sailing
through gaps (diekplous) and either smashing through one's own oars or wheeling
about and attacking from behind.b And commanders had to consider yet a third fac
tor: ships could not be so closely packed that their oars interfered with those of the
adjacent ship in their own line. If a commander did not trust his single line to hold
out against a superior opponent, he might form a second line behind the first, to
cover the point(s) of weakness.< A fleet whose line had been outflanked or breached
had few defensive options. A commander with skilled crews could pull his ships into
a circle, prows bristling outward, and hope to stave off his opponents until exhaus
tion or nightfall prompted them to give up the attack. Or he could order a tactical
retreat to a nearby beach from which his ships could be similarly defended.d
§4. It was extremely difficult to achieve any of these offensive or defensive forma
tions. Ancient accounts of naval encounters frequently describe how winds, currentS,
the crews' varying levels of skill and commitment, and the unpredictable fortunes of
war• altered the blueprints of battles. Drills on the Olympias,b a modern reconstruction
K.3a
K. 3b
K.3c

See 1.6.31, 2.1.23.

The Athenian formation at Arginousai was
designed to prevent this; �c 1.6.31.
Sec 1.6.29-32 for the dcplO)'mcnts of the two
opposing fleetS at the battle of the Arginousai
Islands (Ref. Map 2, BY).
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K.4b

The O/ympi41 was designed by scholars and

marine

architects and commissioned in 1987. The ship is
on permanent display at the Hdlcnic Navy

Museum, ncar the Pciraicus. Sec Figures K.l, K.2,

K.3, and 2.2.7; sec also}. S. Morrison,}. F.
Coates, and N. B. Rankov, Tht Athmia11 Trireme:

K.3d

Sec 1.1.7.

71Jt History swd Reconstruction ofsw A11cimr Grtdt

K.4a

For example, Kallikratidas' unfortunate tumble at
1.6.33.

Warship, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univcr·
siry Press, 2000), esp. pp. 231-75.
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of a trireme, have demonstrated the difficulties that a crew would have in hearing and
executing orders in quiet, controlled conditions, much less in the tumult of battle.
§5. It is no wonder, then, that commanders frequently resorted to trickery and
unorthodox measures to increase their chance of success. The outcomes of many of
the sea battles recounted by Xenophon hinged on the element of surprise. One
favored technique was the attack or escape under cover of night.• Landmarks were
the primary means of navigation in Greek antiquity, and so sailing was mainly a day
light activity. Even battles ceased at sundown. Perhaps because it was so unusual,
Xenophon vividly describes the extraordinary nature of the Spartan vice-admiral
Gorgopas' nighttime pursuit of an Athenian squadron and the ensuing moonlight
batde.b Experience on the Olympias indicates that rowing triremes is always a noisy
process and sound carries great distances over water. Night escapades could only
have been successful because they exploited what the enemy reasonably expected.
Other tricks succeeded for the same reason. Whatever the exact purpose of Konon's
sidescreens,' his escape plan worked because repetition lulled the enemy into com
placent inattention. Those tables were famously turned on Konon at Aigospotamoi,d
where the Athenians were defeated not by fast ships or skilled crews but by hungry
bellies and each side's expectation that the other would follow precedent.
§6. A rammed ship, even if severely damaged, did not sink immediately. There
were no significant obstacles to bar the crews from jumping overboard; the empty
wooden hull would swamp and become completely unmaneuverable but would float
on the surface for some time until it became completely waterlogged and finally sank.
It was the victor's prerogative to sail out among the debris of the battlefield and col
lect the drifting hulls and men. Captured enemy were enslaved (or worse);• captured
hulls were refitted or salvaged for parts and material. b Rams, which were made of
bronze and could weigh more than half a ton, were salvaged where possible for the
value of the metal or perhaps for reuse on other ships. Sometimes captured rams were
sawn off by the victors and erected as trophies on land nearest to the battle site.'
§7. The Achilles' heel of the ancient navy was its crew. The need to feed, finance,
occupy, and sometimes even inspire the rowers was a crucial element of any naval
campaign. First and foremost was the need to feed and rest the rowers. Rowing was
a cramped, stifling, sweaty, smelly job. The long, narrow warships had limited space
for provisions or preparing meals and no place at all for rowers to stretch out and
sleep. One of the extraordinary aspects of the Spartan admiral Teleutias' night raid
into the Peiraieus harbor was that the ships were rowed continuously, with oarsman
resting (presumably at their benches) at alternating turns.• Every trireme captain had
to think daily about where he would be able to stop for the night and how his sailors
would get fed. Sailors could bring some food on board and eat "on the run," but
more often mealtimes meant putting in to shore to allow sailors to forage in town or
countryside. These midday breaks, when ships were beached and troops dispersed,
K.5a

For instances in the Hellmika where forces

opponent, see 1.1.13, 1.6.28, 4.8.35, 5. 1.8-9 ,
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locate their base camp far away from city markets

i

maneu·vered at night in order tO surpr se their

K.5b

5.1.19, 5.1.25, 6.2.11.
See 5 1.8-9.

K.5c

See 1.6.19 and n. 1.6.19a.

K.5d

See 2.1.20-29. Lysander's trickery exploited the

poor decision made by the Athenian

that could supply food to the fleet's crews.

K.6a

See2.1.31.

K.6b

See 1.1.18, where Syracusans burn ships rather

K.6c
K.7a

See 2.3.8, 6.2.36.
Sec 5.1.19.

than lea\'C them to their \'ictorious opponents.

leaders to

K
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were moments of great vulnerability. Lysander based his winning strategy at
Aigospotamoi on his enemies' need to forage for meals far from their ships.b The
Athenian Iphikrates, whom Xenophon praises as the naval commander par excel
lence,< forestalled this danger by training his men simultaneously to eat and to main
tain lookouts and be at the ready for immediate redeployment.d Logistics forced
fleets to hug the coasts-a factor that had to be planned for defensively and could be
aggressively exploited.
§8. A trireme captain also had to keep his crew paid. The crew could consist of all
or a mixture of slaves, lower-class citizens, resident aliens (metics) or mercenaries.• All
,

had to be paid to row, as they needed to purchase food and other necessities with their
own funds.b Oarsmen, especially noncitizens, might change ships for better pay.
Lysander, for example, urged Artaxerxes to fix the pay at one Attic drachma per day on
the grounds that "if this was the wage offered, the Athenian crews would desert their
ships.

"c

Lysander, Kallikratidas, Konon, and Teleutias all struggled to fund their fleets,d

and Xenophon's account is peppered with references to the need to pay rowers.•
§9. Idle crews were a potential source of trouble and were certainly a waste of
money. Thus we hear of Syracusan sailors helping the city of Antandros finish fortifica
tions while their fleet was being rebuilt, of Konon's sailors rebuilding the Long Walls,
and of Iphikrates "maintaining" his sailors by letting them work on the land for the
Corcyraeans.• The task of keeping sailors employed was particularly troublesome when
the fleets remained stationed abroad over the winter. The sailing and fighting season
regularly lasted from May through September; cold temperatures, storms, and con
trary winds and currents reduced sea traffic to a minimum in the intervening months,
although some instances of voyages and even battles during winter are known.b
§10. Maintaining crew cohesiveness was paramount to the effective functioning
of the trireme. Trials on the Olympias demonstrated that even very experienced row
ers need extensive group practice in order to coordinate their strokes sufficiently to
achieve the speeds and perform the maneuvers ascribed to triremes. First, each indi
vidual had to became proficient at rowing on a specific level: oar mechanics and visi
bility varied significantly depending on one's position relative to the waterline and
the ends of the ship. Second, close cooperation was vital to keeping all those oars
working in tandem; the consequences of blades clashing like a row of falling domi
noes could easily wreak havoc along the entire line. The need for constant training
was no different in antiquity.• One unexpected discovery of the modern experiment
was that the dense wooden environment absorbed sound within the confines of the
K.7b

See 2.1.25, 2.1.27.

K.7c

See 6.2.32.

K.7d

See 6.2.28-29.

K.8a

worl<.ing the land at Corcyra (Ref. Map 2, BW), see
6.2.37.

K.9b

For use of mercenaries at sea, see 7.1.12; for slaves,

see 1.6.24 and S.l.ll; for me tics, see Thucydides

All locations in this note can be found on Ref.

Map 2

at the coordinates indicated. See Thucy·

dides 8. 30-44 for naval operations in the winter

7.63.3.

of 412/11 in the Aegean (BX), Samos (CY}, Chios

K.8b

See 2.1.27.

(CY), Rhodos (DY}, Ionia (CY}, and Caria (CZ).

K.8c

See 1.5.4.

At l.l.l2 the battle of Abydos (AY) is thought by

K.8d

See 1.1.24-25, 1.5.3-8, 1.6.6, 1.6.18, 2. l.ll,

some to have been fought as late as November,

2.l.l4, 4.8.10, 4.8.12, 5.1.24. See also 2.3.40,

and others believe that the battle of Cyzicus (AY),

6.2.1.

l.l.l4-19, took place earlier than May 410.

K.8e

See 1.5.4-7, 1.6. 1 2, 2.1.5, 2.l.l2, 5.l.l3, 5.1.24.

K.9a

For Syracusans at Antandros (Ref. Map 2, AY), see

1.1.16. Iphikrates had his fleet train and practice

(Ref. Map 5), see 4.8.10; for

6.2.32.

1.1.26; for rebuildin g the Long Walls of Athens
lphikrates' sailors

K.lOa Mindaros' fleet was out practicing maneuvers at
maneuvers as it sailed toward Corcyra, 6.2.30,
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hull, making it very difficult for the rowers to hear signals. As a result, each oarsman
relied heavily on the body language of those sitting directly in front of or above
him. The crew became an integrated network, and holes or substitutions in the row
ing arrangement threw a wrench in the gears of the rowing machine. Rowers were
not randomly replaceable.
§11. It was the responsibility of the captain (trierarch) to keep his crew trained
and intact.• In the Athenian system, captaincy was a one-year public service, under
taken by only the wealthiest citizens as a sort of patriotic burden or tax. The state
supplied a ship, the minimum necessary equipment, and the basic rate of pay for a
crew; the captain was responsible for hiring the crew and outfitting and maintaining
(and returning) the ship. The amateur captain probably relied heavily on his paid
staff. The most important member (and the only one who is ever named) was the
helmsman

(kybernetes).

Alcibiades trusted his helmsman, Antiochos, enough to give

him command of the fleet during Alcibiades' absence, and it is the helmsmen who
are caJJed as witnesses in the trial of the Arginousai generals.b Ultimate command of
a fleet lay in the hands of one or several of the generals

(strategoi) elected by the cit

izens to lead the army or the fleet. Sparta had a specific office of admiral (navarch),
but men appointed to this position might or might not have much experience on
the water ,c and the assignment of a commander perceived as incompetent was
another potential source of grumbling among the crews.d
§12. Xenophon's predecessor, Thucydides, had chronicled the glory days of clas
sical sea power. Control of the water serves as a focus and a metaphor in his story of
Athenian imperialism. He gives us, also, a glimpse of the beginning of the end. We
see the Athenians lose their edge in naval technology; the Peloponnesian allies
develop new warship designs and strategies that the Athenians emulate too late.
Xenophon is by comparison a landlubber; the sea is

an

element, but not a center

piece, in his account of Athens' and Sparta's final bitter decline. His story of the sea
and its ships is not nearly as detailed or coherent. But in his narrative we can see the
human dimension of naval warfare and the pivotal role of the anonymous rowers in
the struggle for command of the Aegean. Two generations later, Alexander the
Great circumvented the need for rowers and gained control of the seas by conquer
ing the coasts and ports on which the fleets of the eastern Mediterranean relied for
manpower, provisions, and timber.
Nicolle Hirschfeld
Assistant Professor
Department of Classical Studies
Trinity University
San Antonio, Texas
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For difficulties in keeping triremes fully manned,

mon the Megarian advises the Spartan admiral

see

Kallikratidas.

1.5.20, 5.1.27, 6.2.12.

K.llb Akibiades leaves Antiochos in charge at

1.5.11-12,
a

witness

in the Arginousai

instance in the

trial

at 1.7.6. Another

Hellmilt4 that shows

the impor·

ranee of the helmsman is at 1.6.32, when Her·
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and the generals furnish a helmsman as

Agesilaos a p pointed his inexperienced brother·in·
law Pcisander to command the Spartan fleet

K.lld

(3.4.29).

Spartan sailors complained of Kallikratidcs' quali·

fications when he replaced Lysander (1.6.4).

